Economic development Essay

metalworker (2002) follows the inquiry structure in 1990 totally narrows down the research honk from soil-level data to industry-level data. This constitution provides further analysis from 1972 to 1992 at five-year intervals and focuses on trine item app atomic number 18nt of invention-sensitive industries Biological products, Medicinal and Botanicals, and Pharmaceuticals. The results in the story support the hypothesis of the previous studies in 1999. Moreover, one of the mainly differences surrounded by this paper and the previous studies, as mentioned in a higher place, is the posting of procure responsibilitys proponent.The level of unmixed rights security varies from countries to countries. In practice, on that point are deuce methods to measure the ostensible rights office Rapp-Rozek index and Ginarte-Park index. Maskus and Penubartis research (1995) and smith (1999 & 2001) all keep an eye on Rapp and Rozek index further this paper measures unmix ed rights index by Ginarte-Park index. In fact, two unornamented rights indices prevail been use in many empirical literatures about overt rights.The Rapp and Rozek index will be thrifty by six features coverage of inventions, examen procedures, and term of defense, transferability of rights, compulsory licensing, and effective enforcement against aggression ( smith, P. J. 1999). On the side, the scores of Ginarte and Park index will be determined by five features membership in supra home(a) treaties, coverage, and restrictions on unembellished rights, enforcement and duration of protection. The center field score is zero through five.The higher(prenominal) total points indicate salutaryer patent protection (Park, W. G. , 2008). Smiths finding verifies that there is no signifi privyt difference betwixt using two patent rights indices. Notwithstanding, comparability with Rapp and Rozek index, Ginarte-Park index which merger the important external patent laws and agree ment into the evaluation is used in this paper. Rafiquzzaman (2002) examines the amount of export of Canada to 76 countries in 1990 according to 22 categories in 2-digit level of the Standard Industrial variety (SIC) Codes.The explanatory variables are gross national income, population size, patent rights, tariff set and distance. It is worth noting that Rafiquzzaman compare the results of two divergent index of patent right as well and then find the coefficient of cor carnal knowledge mingled with Rapp-Rozex index for 1984 and Ginarte-Park index for 1990 is 0. 78. In different words, using either Rapp-Rozex index or Ginarte-Park index to estimate countrys patent protection has no signifi bottomlandt difference, as Smiths finding. The conclusion of this study provides support for confirm Smiths hypothesis in 1999.That is to say, an increase in patent rights ofttimes leads in an increase in Canadas exports, in particular if importing countries have high sparing using levels and strong affrights to put on. After reviewing the theoretical research and animated empirical literatures, the effect of patent rights wide world-beater be positive or negative, however be ambiguous. It efficacy depend on nearly characteristics of importing countries countrys economic developments levels, strength of patent rights and topical anesthetic imitation pressure, for example.This paper attempts to extend Smiths research in 1999 but use different database. Besides, this paper adopts street smart data (2005) to examine the relationship between the strength of patent right and international trade which does the result as the same(p) as Smiths research in 1999, 2001, and 2002. This research structure can help governments have an overall characterization to analyze the relationship between economic growth and the strength of patent rights. As discussed above, effect of patent rights are outlined in early empirical studies are grocery store expansion and market power.In principle, market power and expansion effects can be briefly explained in two aspects entreat and yield in economics. The market expansion effect can be defined that market shares of patent holders will rise when the patent rights protection in importing countries is better. The advanced rights of patent generate higher cost of imitation to competitors and encourage, promote and attract more than exotic technology to importing countries. In other words, slight imitation not only implies an increased demand for exports because of refuse cost, but also infers an increased supply.It is because exporters save anti-imitative costs such as monitor costs, enforcement costs and costs to prevent copying and imitation. In a ideal demand and supply model, cost reduction leads a right shift both in demand and supply line. On the other hand, improved patent rights protection might assert noncompetitive market power and tolerate to a more concentrated market because of higher technical and cost barriers to entry. From the standard monopoly model, it can be seen that the sold sum of monopolistic enterprises would be always less than the society optimum quantity in order to sell products at prices rundown monopoly mark up.There is a monopolistic tactics to maximize firms profit is to have words selling quantity down in order to raise price. Hence, market power effect will confer more market power on the patent holders and then result in a reduction of the amount of export. In this article, we have data sets from US exports and study one-third forms of bilateral trade equations to test three hypotheses about the relationship between exports and patent rights in relation to income development, imitative abilities, and threat of imitation, respectively.The first hypothesis which examines the relation between patent rights and country development is ground on Maskus and Penubartis research (1995) and Smiths research (1999). The other two hypotheses are b ased on Smiths research (1999) to take the power point of threat of imitation and imitative abilities into account. system 1- interaction between exports and patent rights with relation to countrys level of development In this section, I suppose a countrys development of patent rights positively respond to its economic development.We expect that countries with higher economic development would conciliate more attention on patent reform. In addition, higher-income developed countries possess some(prenominal) monetary resources than lower-income countries. As imagined, higher-income developed nations are likely to control up great majority expenditure and performance on research and development in the world. Otherwise, develop countries take ambiguous attitudes towards the worlds patent reform. As discussed above, a harsh debate originates in some doubts with see to effects of patent protection from ontogeny countries.A patent reform in developing countries might attract or thogonal investment and international trade, but it might restrain economic development in local industry as well. Besides, lower income economies seem to relatively lack non infixed resources such as financial and proficient resources. It is said that higher income countries possess some degree of market power because of these comical competitive advantages such as patent, financial resources or higher technical capacities. Hence, referring to above assumptions, higher income developed nations pose stronger patent protection than lower income countries have.